 |
 |
 |
 |
Call us at: 800-360-4146
Application Note Page 1
Perimeter Security for Water Treatment Plants using Stealth-Flex and Outdoor Passive Infrared Sensors
Perimeter Security for Water Treatment Plants using Stealth-Flex and Outdoor Passive Infrared Sensors
The Background
In the light of recent events, the safety of the nation's water supply has become a major concern. The American Water Works Association says that large water systems will spend $450 million on "vulnerability assessments" ordered by Congress. An additional $1.6 billion is needed for basic security at pumping stations and treatment plants: alarms, cameras, fences. Better walls and backup pumps will cost billions more. "The threat is imponderable, but . . . it could be catastrophic," says G. Tracy Mehan, Environmental Protection Agency assistant administrator. "It doesn't fit any cost-benefit calculation." In this environment, there is a need for security systems which are both effective and affordable.
The Threat
The image of a terrorist slipping into a water treatment plant with a vial of a potent chemical or biological agent does not reflect the real danger to the water supply, as seen by most experts. To be effective, an attack will have to be on a larger scale. Only a vast quantity of such contaminants, probably truckloads could cause sickness. Danger exists also from explosions, which could cut off water supplies to firefighters while other sites are set alight. The threat is real - industry officials warn of plans of US water systems found in terrorist hideouts. In response to this threat, after September 11, Congress approved $90 million in antiterrorism grants to water systems.
In the light of recent events, the safety of the nation's water supply has become a major concern. The American Water Works Association says that large water systems will spend $450 million on "vulnerability assessments" ordered by Congress. An additional $1.6 billion is needed for basic security at pumping stations and treatment plants: alarms, cameras, fences. Better walls and backup pumps will cost billions more. "The threat is imponderable, but . . . it could be catastrophic," says G. Tracy Mehan, Environmental Protection Agency assistant administrator. "It doesn't fit any cost-benefit calculation." In this environment, there is a need for security systems which are both effective and affordable.
The Threat
The image of a terrorist slipping into a water treatment plant with a vial of a potent chemical or biological agent does not reflect the real danger to the water supply, as seen by most experts. To be effective, an attack will have to be on a larger scale. Only a vast quantity of such contaminants, probably truckloads could cause sickness. Danger exists also from explosions, which could cut off water supplies to firefighters while other sites are set alight. The threat is real - industry officials warn of plans of US water systems found in terrorist hideouts. In response to this threat, after September 11, Congress approved $90 million in antiterrorism grants to water systems.
Electronic Surveillance of Water Treatment Plants
Good physical security is essential to the protection water treatment plants and water storage tanks, which are often in a remote location. Walls and fences should be in a good state of repair. Alarm response systems should be in place. There is no point in detecting intruders, if the response to an alarm is not fast enough to intercept them or no equipment is in place to record what they have done. In addition, lighting should be adequate for seeing and recording intruders. There are many other security measures that should be implemented, including the securing of hatches, manholes etc. This application note deals specifically with securing the perimeter of a plant.
The electronic surveillance system should be based on the following principles:
Good physical security is essential to the protection water treatment plants and water storage tanks, which are often in a remote location. Walls and fences should be in a good state of repair. Alarm response systems should be in place. There is no point in detecting intruders, if the response to an alarm is not fast enough to intercept them or no equipment is in place to record what they have done. In addition, lighting should be adequate for seeing and recording intruders. There are many other security measures that should be implemented, including the securing of hatches, manholes etc. This application note deals specifically with securing the perimeter of a plant.
The electronic surveillance system should be based on the following principles:
| · | Reliability of detection |
| · | Stability - Excessive false alarms can result in the failure to respond appropriately. False alarms are a real problem in outdoor protection. A dual system in which an alarm from one detection technology can be verified by an alarm from the other, as described in this application note, is designed to provide the required level of stability. |
| · | Moderate zone length - It is important to be able to know where an attack is occurring, both for alarm response and for recording of the event. Shorter detection zones also allow easier trouble shooting, as problems can be traced to a smaller area. |
The system described in this application note consists of a first line of defense in the form of the Stealth-Flex fence protection system and verification provided by outdoor passive infrared barrier detectors, as shown below. Specification sheets both these systems can be downloaded from www.stealthlabs.com.
Verified perimeter protection using Stealth-Flex cable for initial detection and a PIR barrier for verification. Pre-alarm is generated by an attempt to cut or climb the fence. The alarm is verified by detection by the PIR barrier.
Continue to Next Page: The First Line of Defense - Stealth-Flex Fence Protection System